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High availability (HA) is becoming an increasingly important requirement for
enterprise systems. It is even mandatory for critical systems who cannot afford
downtime. Such systems produce huge amounts of trace data, where functional
and non-functional aspects, such as availability, security, and safety, are inter-
twined; hence they are hard to dissociate and to analyze. Dynamic analysis aims
at capturing and analyzing the run-time behavior of a system based on its execu-
tion traces. Retrieving and analyzing system high availability aspects would help
analysts understand and report on how a system is recovering failures. In addi-
tion, it would help maintainers verify the compliance of observed behaviors with
the intended availability requirements. The aim of this thesis is to apply dynamic
analysis to retrieve and analyze high availability scenarios from system execution
xii
traces. We developed an automated approach that retrieves and analyzes high
availability scenarios from system execution traces. Traces are first collected from
systems running high availability features, then filtered, merged, and segmented.
The extracted execution phases are then correlated, analyzed, and visualized, allow-
ing for fault detection and diagnosis. We evaluated empirically the effectiveness
of our approach using four real-world case studies of networks running the Cisco
Hot Standby Router Protocol (HSRP). Results show that HSRP-related event trig-
gers and associated actions were successfully retrieved, correlated, and visualized.
Furthermore, results show that our prototype tool (HAAnalyzer) was able to detect
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 تحمل تستطيع ال التي الحرجة لألنظمة إلزامي هو بل .الشركات ألنظمة كبيرة أهمية ذوالعالية مطلباً  اإلتاحة أصبحت خاصية
وتنتج هذه األنظمة كميات هائلة من بيانات التتبع، حيث تتشابك الجوانب الوظيفية وغير الوظيفية، مثل اإلتاحة واألمن  .التوقف
والسالمة؛ ومن ثم يصعب فصلها وتحليلها. التحليل الديناميكي يهدف إلى استخراج وتحليل سلوك تشغيل النظام اعتماداً على بيانات 
حليل جوانب اإلتاحة العالية من شأنه أن يساعد المحللين على فهم وإعداد تقرير عن كيفية استعادة النظام التتبع للتنفيذ. استرجاع وت
عند حدوث فشل. باإلضافة إلى ذلك، فإنه سيساعد القائمين بعملية الصيانة على التحقق من توافق السلوكيات المالحظة مع متطلبات 
 بيانات من العالية اإلتاحة سيناريوهات وتحليل السترداد الديناميكي التحليل تطبيق وه الرسالة هذه من الهدف اإلتاحة المقصودة.
 يتم .النظام التتبع لتنفيذ بيانات من العالية اإلتاحة سيناريوهات وتحليل باسترداد يقوم آلي نهج بتطوير النظام. قمنا التتبع لتنفيذ
 يتم بعد ذلك .وتقطيعها الى مراحل تصفيتها ودمجها يتم ثم العالية، اإلتاحة خاصيةتتوفر فيها  أنظمة من التتبع أوالً  بيانات تجميع
ً بتقييم قمنا .وتشخيصها األخطاء باكتشاف يسمح مما وعرضها، وتحليلها المستخرجة التنفيذ مراحل ربط  نهجنا فعالية تجريبيا
الجاهز  الموجه االحتياطي بروتوكول سيسكو الذي يسمى بتشغيل تقوم التي للشبكات واقعية حالة دراسات أربع باستخدام
(HSRP( تشير النتائج إلى أن مشغالت الحدث المرتبطة بـ .)HSRP واإلجراءات المرتبطة بها تم استردادها بنجاح، وتم )
ف وتشخيص ( كانت قادرة على اكتشاHAAnalyzerربطها، وعرضها. عالوة على ذلك، تظهر النتائج أن أداة النموذج األولي )




A large part of software maintenance is software comprehension. In order to ac-
quire an adequate level of understanding of a software system, software engineers
have to spend tremendous amount of time to study different software artifacts,
e.g., design document, source code, system test plan, etc. [2]. However, in real-
ity, most of actual systems have outdated and poor documentation, if it exists
at all. Dynamic analysis is one common approach used to recover and compre-
hend system functionalities, using run-time data [3]. Typically, a system source
code is instrumented in a way that when run, it generates a trace, also called
a log, that contains the sequence of actions and events that the system executes
during a particular scenario run. Such traces map high-level descriptions of the
software behavior (emanating from SRSs and design documents) with low-level
implementation, i.e., source code. The resulting traces are then used to analyze
system behavior. However, dynamic analysis suffers from the problem of size ex-
plosion [4], since the size of an execution trace may range from several thousands
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to several millions of lines. To address this problem, researchers proposed many
trace compression, simplification, and abstraction techniques [5, 6, 7, 8, 9].
Non-functional requirements (NFR) describe a broad and important range of
system quality attributes, such as performance, availability, and reliability. They
are often more critical than functional aspects in the determination of a system’s
perceived success or failure. However, dynamic analysis has been applied mainly
to capture and understand functional properties of systems and less research ad-
dressed system quality attributes [10].
Dependability is the property that enables the users to rely on a system. De-
pendability is defined as “that property of a computer system such that reliance
can justifiably be placed on the service it delivers” [11]. As well as being a criti-
cal property for a wide variety of applications, e.g., energy, telecommunications,
banking, etc., dependability is also regarded as being multi-dimensional since it
encloses many attributes such as availability and reliability. Avizienis et al. [12]
defined availability as being “the readiness for a correct service”. More practically,
availability denotes the measure of how often or how long a service or a system
component is available for use. Jalote [13] considered that building system avail-
ability can be achieved through component redundancy, repair, or fault masking.
Different notions of availability have been discussed in the literature [14], including
basic availability, continuous availability and high availability (HA). High avail-
ability is defined as the capacity of a system to satisfy its requirements despite
failures [14]. High availability features help systems remain operational at all
2
times (even if failures occur) with no perceived loss of service.
The major motivation of this research is to apply dynamic analysis to retrieve
and analyze system high availability scenarios from system execution traces. More
specifically, our aim is to help system analysts understand high availability mech-
anisms, in presence of failures, given a run-time system execution trace. Further-
more, the proposed analysis may help validate the compliance of the behavior
of a given high availability feature implementation with its intended behavior
(described in its requirements specification).
1.1 Problem Statement
The research problem statement can be stated as follows:
“How to apply dynamic analysis in order to extract and analyze high avail-
ability scenarios from system execution traces ?”
We have addressed this problem by proposing a dynamic analysis approach to
retrieve, visualize, and analyze system availability scenarios from execution traces.
1.2 Research Hypotheses
Although there is a large body of research applying dynamic analysis to recover
functional aspects from system execution traces [3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9], little work has
been devoted to applying dynamic analysis to non-functional aspects such as avail-
ability and security.
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Our three research hypotheses can be stated as follows:
Research Hypothesis 1:
Our first research hypothesis is denoted as follows:
Large and complex system execution traces can be filtered and reduced to focus
on high availability aspects.
Research Hypothesis 2:
Our second research hypothesis is denoted as follows:
High availability scenarios, embedded in log traces, can be segmented (into
execution phases) and correlated in order to link failures and recovery mechanisms.
Research Hypothesis 3:
Our third research hypothesis is denoted as follows:
High availability scenarios can be analyzed effectively allowing for fault detec-
tion and diagnosis.
1.3 Thesis Approach
We intend to validate our research hypothesis by developing an approach,
called HAAnalyzer, that extracts and analyzes HA scenarios. The proposed ap-
proach is implemented in a prototype tool.
Figure 1.1 describes the main steps of our approach as an activity diagram
(following a pipe and filter approach). It consists of four major steps: (1) collect,
filter and merge relevant execution traces, (2) segment and correlate the merged
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Figure 1.1: High availability scenarios retrieval and analysis approach
As a proof of concept, we validate our approach empirically using scenarios
collected from four real-world network topologies implementing the Cisco Hot
Standby Router Protocol (HSRP) [15].
1.4 Thesis Contributions
This thesis offers four main contributions:
1. Contribution 1: Integrated high availability recovery approach: It
provides an integrated approach to retrieve high availability scenarios from
system execution traces.
2. Contribution 2: Segmentation of the high availability scenarios: It
offers a fine-grained segmentation using rule-based approach.
3. Contribution 3: Fault detection and diagnosis capability: It allows
for the detection and diagnosis of issues that may occur during the execution
of an HA scenario. Our approach allows for the detection of functional
(behavioral) and temporal issues.
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4. Contribution 4: HAAnalyzer prototype tool: It provides a prototype
tool, called HAAnalyzer, that automates all proposed activities, e.g., execu-
tion trace filtering, consolidation, segmentation, correlation, visualization,
and analysis. Although, HAAnalyzer is HSRP specific, it can be adapted
and extended to include other HA features.
1.5 Issues not addressed in this thesis
Although our proposed approach and tool can be applied (with no significant
changes) to other closely related HA availability features such as the Virtual
Router Redundancy Protocol (VRRP) and the Gateway Load Balancing Protocol
(GLBP), the current approach is tailored to HSRP running on Cisco routers.
1.6 Thesis Organization
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 introduces back-
ground about the concepts used in this thesis. Chapter 3 presents and discusses
the related works which are about trace analysis. Chapter 4 presents a de-
scription of our approach for recovering the availability scenarios and information
about the tool support. Chapter 5 provides a demonstration of the feasibility of
our approach. The discussion of the benefits as well as the threats to validity are




In this chapter, we introduce system execution traces, system availability, and
briefly present Cisco HSRP protocol.
2.1 System Execution Traces
Execution Traces (also known as logs) are, generally, accessory text files produced
by software applications [16]. Execution traces record information about all
activities of the system (e.g., user actions, system events, etc.) in either one single
file, multiple files, or streams of data [17]. It is generally accepted that having
traces becomes mandatory in computer network applications, operating systems,
and distributed systems [16]. Moreover, if utilized properly, execution traces can
represent a big asset to an organization because it contains vital information about
system and user events [18]. One of the main purposes of producing such execution
traces is debugging [16]. In addition, according to Nagappan [17], traces can be
also used in system monitoring, fault diagnosis, and identification of privacy and
7
security violations.
As stated in [17], typically, the information in an execution trace consists
of: (1) timestamps, (2) event or action description, (3) system state informa-
tion, (4) error information, (5) user information, and (5) application information.
However, there is no standard format to describe traces [18]. Indeed, there are
different trace formats and every system or organization has its own execution
trace format [16]. For example, the NCSA (National Center for Supercomputing
Applications) log formats (common, combined, and separate with date) are based
on NCSA HTTPd, and are widely accepted as standard among HTTP server ven-
dors. The NCSA Common log format (sometimes referred to as the Access Log)
contains only basic HTTP access information. It has the following format:
host rfc931 username date:time request statuscode bytes
167.167.110.110 - jdoe [12/Nov/2005:22:16:07 +0500] ”GET /index.html
HTTP/1.0” 200 1043
Figure 2.1: NCSA Common Log Format
Figure 2.1 illustrates an example of a common NCSA log format. Host
(167.167.110.110) represents the IP address or host/subdomain name of the HTTP
client that made the HTTP resource request. rfc931 (”-” in the example) repre-
sents the identifier of the client making the HTTP request (”-” means no value is
present). The username (jdoe in the example) is used to authenticate the client
(”-” means no value is present). The date:time timezone ([12/Nov/2005:22:16:07
+0500] in the example) represent the date and time stamp of the HTTP re-
quest. The request (”GET /index.html HTTP/1.0” in the example) represents
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the HTTP request, composed of the requested resource (index.html), the HTTP
method (GET), and the HTTP protocol version (1.0). The statuscode (200 in the
example) indicates the success or failure of the HTTP request. The bytes field
(1043 in the example) represents the number of bytes of data transferred as part
of the HTTP request (not including the HTTP header).
An extension of the NCSA Common log format is the NCSA Combined log
format. It contains the same information as the Common log format plus three
(optional) additional fields: the referral field (i.e., The URL which linked the user
to your site), the user agent field (i.e., the Web browser and platform used by the
visitor to your site), and the cookie field (i.e., take the form of KEY = VALUE).
Microsoft Internet Information Server (IIS) uses W3C Extended Log Format.
Figure 2.2 illustrates the directives in the W3C Extended format [19].
Figure 2.3 illustrates an example of the Microsoft IIS W3C Extended format.
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Field Appears As Description 
Date date The date that the activity occurred. 
Time time The time that the activity occurred. 
Client IP 
Address c-ip The IP address of the client that accessed your server. 
User Name cs-username 
The name of the authenticated user who accessed your server. 
This does not include anonymous users, who are represented 
by a hyphen (-). 
Service 
Name s-sitename 
The Internet service and instance number that was accessed 
by a client. 
Server Name s-computername The name of the server on which the log entry was generated. 
Server IP 
Address s-ip 
The IP address of the server on which the log entry was 
generated. 
Server Port s-port The port number the client is connected to. 
Method cs-method The action the client was trying to perform (for example, a GET method). 
URI Stem cs-uri-stem The resource accessed; for example, Default.htm. 
URI Query cs-uri-query The query, if any, the client was trying to perform. 
Protocol 
Status sc-status The status of the action, in HTTP or FTP terms. 
Win32® 
Status sc-win32-status 
The status of the action, in terms used by Microsoft 
Windows®. 
Bytes Sent sc-bytes The number of bytes sent by the server. 
Bytes 
Received cs-bytes The number of bytes received by the server. 
Time Taken time-taken The duration of time, in milliseconds, that the action consumed. 
Protocol 
Version cs-version 
The protocol (HTTP, FTP) version used by the client. For HTTP 
this will be either HTTP 1.0 or HTTP 1.1. 
Host cs-host Displays the content of the host header. 
User Agent cs(User-Agent) The browser used on the client. 
Cookie cs(Cookie) The content of the cookie sent or received, if any. 
Referrer cs(Referer) The previous site visited by the user. This site provided a link to the current site. 
 
Figure 2.2: W3C Extended Logging Field Definitions
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#Software: Microsoft Internet Information Server 6.0
#Version: 1.0
#Date: 1998-11-19 22:48:39
#Fields: date time c-ip cs-username s-ip cs-method cs-uri-stem
cs-uri-query sc-status sc-bytes cs-bytes time-taken cs-version
cs(User-Agent) cs(Cookie) cs(Referrer)
1998-11-19 22:48:39 206.175.82.5 - 208.201.133.173 GET /glob-
al/images/navlineboards.gif - 200 540 324 157 HTTP/1.0
Mozilla/4.0+(compatible;+MSIE+4.01;+Windows+95)
USERID=CustomerA;+IMPID=01234
Figure 2.3: Example of Microsoft IIS log format
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In our context, we will use Cisco IOS high availability features. A typical Cisco
IOS log message has the following format [20]:
timestamp: %FACILITY -severity -MNEMONIC: Message -text
where timestamp refers to the time of the occurrence of the event or teh re-
ception of a system message, FACILITY refers to the software module/proto-
col/hardware device for which logging is set (e.g.,LINK, PARSER, etc.), Severity
(a digit between 0 and 7) denotes the severity of the event, i.e., 0 being the most
severe (emergency) and 7 being the least severe (debugging), MNEMONIC is a
string that describes the system message. Message-text is a text providing more
information about the event being reported. Figure 2.4 shows an example of a
Cisco IOS log entry. The entry says that the line protocol of interface GigabitEth-
ernet0/1 went up at Feb 14 0:40:10.326.
Feb 14 09:40:10.326: %LINEPROTO-5-UPDOWN: Line protocol on Interface
GigabitEthernet0/1, changed state to up
Figure 2.4: Example of Cisco IOS log entry
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2.2 System Availability
There are many proposed definitions of availability [12, 21, 11, 22, 23]. According
to Standard Glossary of Software Engineering Terminology [22], it is stated that,
the availability of a system is “the degree to which a system or a component is
operational and accessible when required for use”. The definition of availability
according to ITU-T Recommendation E.800[23] is “the ability of an item to be
in a state to perform a required function at a given instant of time, or at any
instant of time within a given time interval, assuming that the external resources,
if required, are provided”.
According to [12, 21, 11], they have treated the availability by the field of
dependability. Laprie et al.[11] modeled availability using the threats to, at-
tributes of, and the means by which dependability is achieved. RossebeØ et al.[1]
adopted this decomposition and proposed a conceptual model for service availabil-
ity that describes the relationship between means, threats, and availability (see
Figure 2.5).
Figure 2.5: Conceptual model for service availability [1]
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In addition to the previous definitions of availability, Avizienis et al.[12] also
defined the system availability as being “the readiness for a correct service”. Jalote
[13] have considered the concept of system reliability as the basis for building the
system availability and that is through including the recovery notion which may be
achieved by component redundancy, repair, or fault masking. A crucial difference
between reliability and availability have been explained by Gokhale et al.[24] as
follows: “reliability refers to failure-free operation during an entire interval, while
availability refers to failure-free operation at a given instant of time”.
In practice, availability requirements are not developed in accordance with
instantaneous availability, but with steady-state availability [25] which refers to
the systems uptime over an enough long period. Availability is represented as
“the ratio of uptime to the sum of uptime and downtime”; and this is the most




where MTBF is the mean time between failures whereas MTTR is the mean time
to repair. Since the above ratio is eventually a number between 0 and 1, so usually,
the percentage is used to express the availability.
Furthermore, availability requirements are crucial in systems characterized as
highly available systems; such as, systems used in telecommunication services
[a.k.a. 5 nines (99,999 %)]. The Service Availability Forum (SAF), which con-
centrates on the issues relevant to high availability requirements, supports the
14
delivery of the highly available carrier-grade systems by the standard interfaces
definition for software management [27], availability management [28] and other
high availability middle-ware services [29].
Bass et al. [30] presented the concept of Redundancy as a basis for the fault
recovery to ensure the availability of the system; such that, when a component
failed, another component(s) is available to take the responsibilities of the failed
component. As for the redundancy configuration that determines the number of
spare nodes, there are three configuration types [31]:
1. 1+1 configuration where there is one active node and one redundant node.
2. 1:N configuration where there is one spare for multiple active nodes.
3. M:N configuration where there are multiple spares for multiple active nodes.
According to [30], redundancy can be divided into three types:
1. Active Redundancy (Hot Redundancy): refers to a configuration where syn-
chronous state of active node(s) is maintained by all redundant spare(s).
2. Passive Redundancy (Warm Redundancy): refers to a configuration where
active node(s) send periodic state updates to redundant spare(s).
3. Spare (Cold Redundancy): refers to a configuration where as long as a
switch-over or fail over not occurred, the redundant spares remain out of
service.
For the availability scenarios, there are several examples which aim to provide
systems with high availability (HA) attribute. Web server HA [32] is one example
15
of availability scenarios. In this example, we assume a network topology contains
one server and many connected nodes. In this case, when the server goes down,
the whole system will be unavailable. To provide HA, it must exist a redundant
server and load balancer. When one server fails, the load balancer detects the
failure and then the redundant server performs the tasks of the failed server.
Stateful Switchover (SSO) functionality is another example of availability sce-
narios that provides HA [33]. It uses the Router Processor Redundant (RPR) to
preserve the availability of a router; such that, when the router processor (RP)
fails, another RP become active and continue performing the routers duties. SSO
can be applied by RPR and RPR+ mechanisms. The difference between them
is that in RPR+, RP need not be reinitialized and reloaded when the active RP
fails.
Another example of availability scenarios is the Automatic Protection Switch-
ing (APS) [34]. It is a mechanism used in SONET network to protect the conti-
nuity of connection. APS requires two interfaces (circuits), one is called “working
interface”and the other is called “protect interface”. The protect interface is
configured with the same configurations of the working interface and they are
communicated through PGP protocol. So, whenever the working interface fails,
the connection turns into the protect interface automatically.
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2.3 Cisco Hot Standby Router Protocol (HSRP)
The increased demand for resilient and reliable data networks by Internet service
providers led network device manufacturers to develop high availability features.
One of the goals of high availability features is to minimize downtime and ser-
vice interruption, through eliminating single points of failure. Redundancy pro-
tocols [35], e.g., HSRP, VRRP, GLBP, etc., come as a solution to ensure high
availability and to eliminate single points of failure.
Hot Standby Router Protocol (HSRP) [15] was developed by Cisco and is
documented in RFC2281 [36] as “a protocol that provides a mechanism which
is designed to support non-disruptive failover of IP traffic in certain circum-
stances” [36]. HSRP provides a mechanism for router/gateway failure detection
and recover. It allows data traffic to flow through the backup router/gateway
following a failure of the primary gateway. By sharing a virtual IP address (must
belong to the same subnet address in use on the LAN) and a MAC (Layer 2) ad-
dress, two or more routers can act as a single virtual router, known as an HSRP
group or a standby group. Within an HSRP group, only one single router is re-
sponsible for routing and forwarding packets that hosts send to the virtual router
IP address. This router is called active router. Another router, called standby
router is elected as a backup and is ready to take the role of the active router in
case the latter fails. This role change is called ”fail-over”. If the standby router
fails (in presence of more than 2 routers) or becomes the active router, then an-
other router is elected as the standby router. Furthermore, HSRP has the ability
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to trigger a fail-over if the HSRP enabled interface(s) on the router go down. It is
worth noting that a network may have multiple HSRP groups, each with a unique
IP address.
Figure 2.6 illustrates a typical HSRP network topology having two sites Site1
and Site2 connected to two switches SW1 and SW2. These two switches are
connected to two routers R1 and R2. Two interfaces (Ethernet 2/0 on R1 with
an IP address 10.1.1.5 and Ethernet 2/0 on R2 with an IP address 10.1.1.10) are
HSRP enabled. R1-E2/0 represents the active node, while R2-E2/0 represents
the standby node. The HSRP group virtual IP is 10.1.1.15 (part of the subnet of
R1-E2/0 and R2-E2/0). The traffic that flows from Site1 to Site2 is sent to the
HSRP virtual IP and it is up to HSRP to decide about the actual traffic path,
i.e., through the active router. In this example, R1 is the active router and the
traffic flows through interface R1-E2/0. Once R1-E2/0 fails (e.g., as a result of a
shut down), router R2 becomes active and R2-E2/0 starts getting all the traffic.
Figure 2.6: HSRP typical topology
Each router in the HSRP group participates in the protocol by implement-
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ing a simple state machine [36]. These state machine states describe the router
current role and externally visible behavior. A state change is triggered by user
configuration or by other HSRP group members state changes [36]. A router may
be in one of these HSRP states:
1. Initial: This is the starting state and indicates that HSRP is not running,
i.e., the router interface is not configured for HSRP. The router enters this
state when it first comes up.
2. Learn: The router has not determined the virtual IP address, and has not
received Hello messages from the active router yet. The router does not
participate in the election of active/standby nodes.
3. Listen: The router knows the virtual IP address, but is neither the active
router nor the standby router. The router is only listening to Hello messages
from those routers.
4. Speak: The router knows the virtual IP address, sends periodic Hello mes-
sages, and is actively participating in the election of the active and/or
standby router.
5. Standby: The router is a candidate to become the next active router in case
of failure of the active router. It sends periodic Hello messages.
6. Active: The router is currently forwarding packets that are sent to the
group’s virtual address. The router sends periodic Hello messages.
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It is worth noting that these HSRP states are listed with respect to their level
of involvement in HSRP behavior, i.e., Initial state is the lowest level (router is not
involved) and Active being the highest level of involvement (router is forwarding
the traffic). This ordering represents the basis for our correlation rules, described
in chapter 4.
The HSRP election process to determine the active and standby routers de-
pends on two main elements HSRP priority and IP address [36]. The HSRP mem-
ber with the highest priority is elected as the active router and the second highest
priority is elected as the standby router [36]. When there are equal priorities, the
highest IP is elected as the active [36]. Each router maintains three timers, an
Active timer, a Standby timer, and a Hello timer. The details of these timers
are irrelevant to our proposed approach. For a detailed description of HSRP, the




Software comprehension is a major challenge in maintenance and 60% of efforts are
spent on understanding of the software before addressing a maintenance task [37].
The past twenty-five years have seen the advent of many techniques to recover
software specification. One of the main challenges that led to the development
of this research field is the fact that most projects have outdated or inexistent
documentation [38] and the amount of time and effort needed to extract the
requirements/specifications from a software.
Most techniques fall in one of the two categories: static analysis and dynamic
analysis [37]. Dynamic analysis aims to recover software specifications from sys-
tem execution traces [18]. System execution traces are considered as the most
informative source for a software maintainer in case an unexpected behavior is
encountered during deployment. [18]. Trace analysis can be either quantitative or
qualitative, automated or manual [39].
In this chapter, we survey related work in the area of trace analysis.
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Ribaud et al. [40] categorized the domains of applications of trace analysis into
ten categories:
1. Counterexample processing : Techniques uses traces containing unwanted be-
havior, e.g., Groce and Wisser [41].
2. Trace Analysis : techniques of this family rely on analyzing a set of traces
and use of specialized query languages. For example, Goldsmith et al. [42]
proposed a language called PTQL to be applied to execution traces.
3. Data-mining : techniques of this family attempt to classify and uncover hid-
den patterns from large execution traces automatically such as the approach
designed by Parsa et al. [43].
4. Pattern Analysis : Techniques that focus on identifying patterns, e.g., Kon-
rad et al. [44].
5. Model-based Diagnosis : it groups the techniques which use the reunification
of high level traces and the interpretation is based on the tools and for-
malisms of model-based engineering such as UML. The approach proposed
by Maoz and Harel [45] is an example of a technique part of the model-based
family.
6. Ontology-driven Diagnosis : the techniques of this family are related to the
classification of knowledge and the system diagnosis is the context of infor-
mation retrieval. An example of such techniques is the work of Jekjantuk et
al. [46].
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7. Model Transformation: the diagnosis process of this family depends on the
use of rule-based transformation such as rewriting. The approach of Kengne
et al. [47] is an example of this family of techniques.
8. Testing : it groups the techniques that aim to unraveling undesired behav-
ior. These techniques depend on the scenario-directed, supervised system-
execution. The approach presented by Lindstrom et al. [48] is an example
of this family.
9. Debugging : the focus of these techniques is to develop tools for correcting
the system behavior through observing, controlling and modifying run-time
execution. An example of these techniques, the one presented by Goldszmidt
et al. [49].
10. Visualization: it groups the techniques that use visual representations of
the traces in the diagnosis process such as Isaacs et al. [50] approach. Visu-
alization techniques include: Tables [51], Charts [52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58],
Trace matrices [59], Graph-based [55, 60, 61], Scatter plot [55], Map with
labeled and colored boxes [62], 3D skyline-like view [63], 3D city metaphor
[64, 56, 60], 3D enhancement to traceability networks [65], and Movie [66].
In what follows, we survey related work addressing both functional and non-
functional aspects:
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3.1 Dynamic analysis of functional aspects
El-Ramly et al. [38] proposed an approach to recover requirements from system-
user interaction traces which records the interaction and activities between the
application and users. Their focus was on the functional requirements only and
the intent of their approach is to capture the original and updated requirements.
They built their recovery method based on discovering and modeling the user
tasks that are accomplished frequently. The tasks were expressed in the form
of sequential-patterns and they formulated the recovery problem as sequential-
pattern mining problem. They named their approach CelLEST and they used
two tools, LeNDI and Mathaino, in their approach. One of the advantages of this
work is that it is automated. However, The results obtained from the approach
are displayed in a table. In their work, the evaluation was based on one example
only and because the approach deals with user-interaction, so more examples are
needed.
Greenyer et al. [67] presented a semi-automatic approach for the analysis of
execution traces w.r.t. scenario-based specification. The main purpose was the
extraction of scenarios from execution traces. These scenarios will help engineers
to understand the behavior of complex systems. The proposed method of the anal-
ysis process consists of: 1) extracting all traces that contain data about a specific
property (e.g. violation). 2) creating a list of all events related to that property.
3) analyzing this list and get the wanted information, such as root cause for the
property (e.g. violation), manually. Their work offers the following advantages:
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1) working with sets of traces, 2) traces are enhanced by adding transition events
and states labels, 3) ad-hoc tool validation, 4) a dynamic, open, and rich trace-
processing API, and 5) support for demonstrating relevant properties. However,
it is clear that the approach depends on human intuition and decision which can
be considered as a disadvantage since the mentality of the peoples is not same.
So, they need to set rules instead of human intuition. Another issue of this work
is that it is not fully automated.
Acuna et al. [68] used trace analysis as part of a method that aims to map
workflows into environments that can be suitable to be run on the cloud system.
As an output, the method generates dataflow graph to show the knowledge struc-
ture. The first step is logging the execution then analyzing it. The trace analysis
method consists of three steps: remove the auxiliary commands (filtering), sep-
arate commands communicating by pipe operator – which used to pass streams
between two items – , and finally, deconstruct the GNU parallel into several com-
mands. The workflows are executed on Paython 2.7.6 and then the analyzed
traces are stored in GraphML [69] and finally, the dataflow graph is visualized
with Graphviz[70]. The advantage of this method is that it is automated. One
drawback of their method is that the generated graph does not contain semantic
information and this may make the graph not fully understandable.
Chang and Ren [71] presented a descriptive language called Test Behavior Lan-
guage (TBL). It can capture system I/O properties shown in traces. The main
purpose of presenting this language is to simplify the validation of system behavior
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properties. TBL starts with converting the data of unstructured trace into struc-
tured terms and store them in a pattern space which is an internal storage. The
conversion of unstructured trace is done by using parameterized patterns which
used in specifying the trace structure, extracting the proper data from trace, and
validating basic logical properties. Later, the stored terms are checked based on
complex test logic which its output is the results of validating system properties.
Although the idea of this work is good, but there is no representation of the out-
put; it just stored in the pattern space. Also, a good thing in their work is that
it is automated.
Alawneh et al. [72] presented an approach that helps in the analysis of massive
trace produced by high performance computing (HPC) applications. The main
objective of their work was designing a trace segmentation approach to help in
understanding the interaction between processes of HPC. They provided an ap-
proach for abstracting the traces to facilitate the analysis. The approach starts
with generate trace by instrumenting the code and then collect the trace. After
that, they segment the trace into smaller clusters by using the changes in the
communication patterns. These clusters represent the phases of execution of a
scenario. The clusters are expressed using binary tree or segmentation tree. The
final process if the identification of the boundary of each phase. One advantage of
this approach is that it is automated. However, the limitations of this approach
are: the utilities are distinguished from core function manually as well as the
phases are labeled manually which is not desirable. Another limitation is the way
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of selecting traces; to select traces, they used various configurations in running
the systems in order to avoid any bias.
Fazzinga et al. [73] tried to find out a solution to the challenge of the traces
which contain only low-level operations and without explicit reference that con-
tains high-level activities. Their proposed a framework was based on finding every
interpretations for the trace. Every interpretation contain a sequence of high-level
activities, which execute the sequence of low-level operations, and a process which
may execute the high-level activities. After finding the all possible interpreta-
tions, they suggested to build compact representation which called cas-graph that
represent all interpretations and associated with a probability to measure the cor-
rectness of each interpretation. Their goal was to abstract the trace to the level
of analyst’s perspective to extract beneficial business process from traces. The
limitation of their framework is the focusing on timing and control-flow aspects
only. Also, their framework is not autoamted.
Saleh et al. [74] used the approach of dynamic trace analysis in the reverse
engineering of distributed systems. Because of the bad documentation of most dis-
tributed systems, the dynamic analysis is the best way for recovering. They used
execution protocol trace as a source to recover the specifications of the system.
The specifications are described by communicating finite state machine (CFSM).
The execution traces are collected at runtime from different components (proto-
cols) and then merged and sorted to reflect their temporal order. After that, they
applied the algorithm of a CFSM synthesis to produce the specifications. One of
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the advantages of this approach is that it is automated.
Fischer et al. [75] presented a methodology to track system evolution by using
the analysis of execution traces and database technology. The basic idea of their
methodology is the analysis and comparison of the execution traces of different
versions of software. The main steps of their methodology are: importing the
execution traces, sequencing the communication, and visualizing. In the first
step, they read the execution trace and each event is represented by one record
in database table. The database table consists of the following fields: id, callee,
caller, type, threadId, level, and cvsitemId. The second step aims to minimize the
quantity of the displayed information and characterize the communications which
occurred between the modules. Although the methodology is automated but there
is one drawback of this work which is the manual computation of the differences
between given execution traces. So, this computation needs to be automated also.
Amalfitano et al. [76] proposed an approach that generate test cases from
execution traces. These test cases are used in the testing of the Rich Internet
Applications (RIAs). Their approach consists of the following steps: collect the
execution traces, generate the test suites, and reduce the test suites. To collect
traces, they used both manual and automatic techniques. In order to generate
test suites, first they define the preconditions of all test cases by getting the RIAs
state which was before recording the execution trace. Secondly, they define the
expected output of the test cases by using a testing oracle. In the last step, they
used test suite selection technique to minimize the size of the test suites. The
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experiments executed in this work contain several limitations which may reduce
the accuracy of the results. These limitations are: the number of user sessions
is small, they used only one user in the collection, and the injected faults are
from one type although there is another types. Therefore, the effectiveness of the
presented approach was not proved perfectly. However, there is an advantage in
this work which is the automation.
Moe and Carr [77] developed a method to solve the challenge of understanding
and modifying distributed systems. The developed method is based on using
execution trace. The method consists of the following steps: 1) tracing the remote
procedures calls using CORBA interceptor. 2) parsing the traced data to get the
summary statistics and also reconstruct call chains. 3) visualizing the parsed data,
to be studied, by using Spotfire.net tool. As a limitation, the developed method
is not flexible enough and needs more flexibility especially when studying the
time scale and sequences. The developed method was not validated empirically.
However, the good thing of this approach is that it is automated.
Liu et al. [78] presented a technique to locate features in source code. The
technique is semi-automated and uses execution traces along with identifiers and
comments as a source to locate features in source code. They collected traces
through a tracer tool called JPDA. The output of the tracer (JPDA) is a set of
methods or classes executed in every thread. To retrieve information or locate
feature from the traces, they used Latent Semantic Indexing (LSI), which is an
advanced information retreival technique. By using LSI, the user can write a
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query about any relevant feature and then LSI display all the executed methods,
relevant to the feature, and ranks them based on similarity to the query. There
are number of issues related to the case studies. For example, is the selected case
study represent real-world program?, also, they are not experts in Eclipse; so the
selected scenarios and formulated queries are programmer’s knowledge dependent.
So that the presented technique was not evaluated well. Also, the output showed
in the table was not clear and it needs more explanation. Another issues in this
work is that it is not fully automated.
Tsai et al. [79] proposed a novel scheme to analyze the execution traces by
using reverse engineering . Through the scheme, they became able to deal with
traces generated from a parallel program. The main goal is to manipulate and
process the trace files in the absence of source code in order to explore the behav-
ior. To represent “high-level structure”of the parallel program and generate new
trace based on the deduced high-level structure, many communicating finite state
machines (FSMs) is used. Each FSM describes thread execution flow in the paral-
lel program. Although the good results, parallelizing trace structure is need to be
studied because the algorithm is parallel inherently. Also, they need to consider
more current states and communication primitives types in order to get accurate
states. Therefore, the evaluation of the proposed scheme was not accurate enough.
However, the scheme is automated which considered as an advantage.
Most of the studies, which use dynamic analysis, are in the context of evolu-
tion or maintenance. Noughi et al. [80] proposed a dynamic analysis approach
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that focus on the behavior of database manipulation to understand it. They im-
plemented their approach into a tool called Dynamic Analysis and Visualization
tool of SQL execution trace (DAViS). By using DAViS, it is possible to under-
stand how database interact with the application program. DAViS is used for
capturing, analyzing, and visualizing the execution traces of SQL. The inputs of
DAViS, in addition to SQL execution traces, are: execution scenario and database
schema which is correspond to scenario. One advantage of this work is the full
automation. However, there is a limitation which may affects the accuracy of the
experiments: the size and complexity of the used system in the experiment were
small which do not reflect the real-world traces. So that, the proposed approach
may not be generalized.
Taniguchi et al. [81] proposed an approach to extract compact sequence dia-
gram, of object oriented programs, from execution traces. They aimed to under-
stand how functions are implemented after several changes. The first step of the
approach is collecting the execution traces of method calls. because the large size
of the information in the traces, they proposed four rules to reduce the size. The
idea of the proposed approach is the compacting of the execution trace through
abstracting the included recursive calls and repetition patterns. Finally, they con-
struct a compact sequence diagram by translating the compacted execution trace.
There is a need for additional compaction rules because the amount of execution
trace should be reduced. Also, the correctness of the results of this approach is
weak since the constructed sequence diagram needs to be evaluated. However, the
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good thing of this work is that it is automated.
Maaradji et al. [82] introduced an automated method to detect gradual and
sudden business process drifts which are under a unified framework. Their pro-
posed method helps in expecting changes in the business processes. Therefore,
the manager can identify and manage the processes in order to avoid affecting
the performance. The presented method consists of extracting infromation about
business processes from the traces and then applying statistical tests, such as Chi-
square test, on these extracted processes to obtain results that can show if there
are gradual and sudden business process drifts. One advantage of this method is
that it is automated. In order to enhance the detection and characterization of the
business process drift, they need to incorporate event payloads. Also, they need
to provide feedbacks which will help users in understanding the process change.
So that, the evaluation is not complete and needs more procedures.
3.2 Dynamic analysis of non-functional aspects
Dosimont et al. [83] proposed an approach to handle the problem of huge appli-
cation traces. They built a framework called FrameSoC to manage and analyze
traces. Their framework is based on storing the traces in a relational database.
Consequently, the techniques of DBMS (DataBase Management System), are
adopted. Also, a generic data-model is used to represent trace information. For
trace analysis, the FrameSoC benefits from DBMS features like querying – which
can be used to retrieve any information from the Database storage – as an analysis
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facility. Although, the approach solved the issue of size of traces but the issue of
time was not addressed clearly since the re-computation of the frequent processes
such as generating microscopic definition is time-expensive. Also, there is an issue
of understandability of the used visualization technique which is the chart. The
chart needs meta data. However, the proposed approach is automated which is
an advantage.
Abdellatif et al. [84] used the traces to design an anti-malware framework
which use a parallel host-based technique and the GPUs for Android mobile de-
vices. The framework consists of three blocks: importing malware signature (out-
side the mobile), collecting the traces, and processing the traces. For trace collec-
tion, they get help from the Strace tool [85] and they only focused on recording
system calls with their arguments. The processing block depends on trace analy-
sis which is performed in two steps: divide the input streams (trace entries) into
several segments , and match segments with imported signatures. Although the
main advantage of this framework is the using of GPU in the malware detection
and it proved its efficiency in minimizing the processing time, but it works with
malware which we have its signature but what about new malwares. So that, the
framework may not be general because it was validated empirically with specific
types of signatures with no details about other signatures. Also, their framework
is not fully automated which is a drawback.
For the purpose of supporting debugging of Java programs, Kusu et al. [86]
designed a framework based on trace analysis. The basic idea of the framework is
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the representing the trace by using the Property Graph Model and then storing the
graph in the graph database system which is Neo4j. In the graph model, the nodes
represent the executed byte codes whereas the edges represent the data or control
dependency. In the analysis phase, they depend on rule-based approach such that
the values must satisfy certain conditions. The advantage of this framework is that
the functional and non-functional requirements are combined in addition to the
good results of memory managements whereas execution time was not satisfactory.
Another advantage of this work is the automation. This work was not validated
empirically and this is a disadvantage.
In networking domain, for the purpose of identifying the organization of at-
tackers with the subordinates, Xu et al. [87] proposed a NetworkTraceFrame. As
stated in [87], in most cases of attacks, attribution traces are left somehow in the
network flow or victim machine. So, these attribution traces could be taken to be
analyzed and then identifying the attack organization. Their method is based on
converting the traces into graph model in form of vertices and edges. During the
traversing of the model, the existence probability algorithm is adopted to figure
out if there are any relevance to organization that made the attacks. The dis-
advantage of this framework is that it works with the known relevance relations
between network attackers only. So that, the work may not be general. Also,
their work is not fully automated which may affects the performance.
In order to locate a position of an infected program code, the malware behavior
should be understood. For that reason, Xu et al. [88] introduced a fully automated
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method that depends on utilizing the program execution traces of memory for
malware analysis. The motivation behind designing their method is that: before
malware attacks achieve their malicious purpose, they must modify the key data
structures and/or control-flow in the execution of normal system. So, they locate
in the memory traces where these modifications appeared and then go back to see
which last block of code is executed. Finally, this block of code might be processed
to mitigate future attacks. Because the size of the memory might be huge, so they
suggested a filtering phase which consists of two steps: 1) identify what are the
maximal address segments which accessed by malicious runs exclusively. 2) from
the identified segments, select a subset of them in which all malicious traces are
covered. Then the selected subset is the real item to be processed by the method.
The issue of their method is with segments which have addresses that were not
seen before in the malicious runs. These segments may contain new vulnerability
but their method did not deal with this situation. The good thing of their method
is that it is fully automated.
Yongyuth [89] proposed a model checking methodology to analyze crypto-
graphic protocols, which depend on using cryptographic techniques, to prevent
against attacks during achieving their tasks such as e-payment protocols, exchange
protocols, and so on. The model consists of two novel techniques: generating the
traces using on-the-fly method and analyzing the traces using textual analysis.
The second technique aims to classify the attacks into groups by using attack
patterns because of the huge number of attack trace. The textual trace analysis
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is iterative process to overcome the issue of finding new attacks. Attack patterns
are designed manually and the classification process is automated. The proposed
model needs to be optimized for the memory requirements and also, automate all
the activities.
Al Haider et al. [90] proposed a framework to enable experts to explore and
analyze traces by using semantic queries. The framework depends on the use
of knowledge base in order to store different concepts that are related to traces
and analysis. The authors proposed to use ontologies as a formal representation
of semantics of execution traces and dynamic analysis. Ontology, in computer
and information sciences, is a way of identifying particular classes of objects and
also the relations between these objects in a certain domain. The framework
consists of combining two techniques: dynamic analysis and ontologies which are
implemented after collecting the traces from software system. The collected traces
are used as an input of trace ontology population which contributes in the mapping
of trace elements into basic concepts of traces. As for trace analysis, there are two
processes used in conjunction:1) Reasoners, which depend on formal semantic, to
deduce facts by using inferences. 2) Semantic querying that allow users to explore
the traces and extract any information from the traces. Although the idea of using
ontologies and dynamic analysis is new, but the traces used in the test cases were
simple. This may affects the efficiency of evaluating the framework. However, one
advantage of this work is the automation of the activities.
Peiris and Hill [91] presented a tool and method that uses system execution
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trace to analyze the performance properties of software (e.g. response time and
throughput). Their tool and method is called System Execution Trace Adaption
Framework (SETAF) and it is built atop of UNITE, which is a tool and method to
analyze the properties of the performance. This framework starts with adapting
dataflow model, extracted from system execution traces, by using user-defined
external adapter into UNITE. Then UNITE uses these dataflow model to analyze
the performance properties of software. Although the work is automated which
is an advantage, but there is one issue with the experiments executed in the
evaluation which is the log statement must be inserted adjacent to the event
statement; otherwise, the results will be incorrect. Also, the table which used to
display results is not clear enough sicne it has data which may not be familiar
with users.
Hassine et al. [92] proposed a framework aimed to recover availability scenarios
from execution traces. The framework consists of three phases: filtering, merging,
and segmentation. The traces are filtered first to extract only beneficial informa-
tion. After filtering the traces, they are merged as a single trace. The next step
is segmenting the merged trace into segments. Finally, the segmented traces are
visualized using the ITU-T standard Use Case Maps (UCM) language extended
with availability annotations. The framework is supported by a tool incorporated
in jUCMNav framework [92]. There are two drawbacks in this framework: 1)
Corse-grained segmentation: Hassine et al. [92] provides two types of phases:
normal path and exception path (containing both failure and recovery). In our
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work, we provide a fine-grained segmentation that considers HSRP state changes.
2) The visualization of the segmented trace is in UCM notation, which most of
the network analysts are not familiar with.
Stiborek et al. [93] proposed an automatic approach to detect malwares. The
approach groups executed unknown binaries which interact with system resources
and then compare each group with relevant family extracted from old traces that
contain malware data. Their approach is based on probabilistic analysis to dis-
cover malware. The problem of this approach is the unaddressed issue of new
malware families which their true purposes do not reveal. Therefore, the work
may not be general since there is no details about new malware families. How-
ever, the good thing of this work is that it is automated.
Benchmarking is used to investigate the performance and behavior of a sys-
tem and the problem is that how to choose relevant benchmarks. Martin and
Marangozova-Martin [94] proposed a solution to profile benchmarks automati-
cally. The solution is based on data collected from execution traces. The profile
consists of the following features: duration, CPU utilization, kernel versus user
time, benchmark type, memory usage, and stability. The next step is collecting
data from the traces into the profile. Finally, they used several metrics, based
on the profile features, to choose relevant benchmark. Although the proposed
solution is automated, but the drawback of the solution is cost of time, storage,
and computation.
Tables 3.1 and 3.2 summarize the reviewed works according to the following
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comparison criteria:
 Recovered item: refers to what item is being recovered by the approach.
 Requirement type (Requ Type): refers to the recovered items weather be-
long to functional requirements (FR) or non-functional requirements (NFR).
 Automated (Auto.): refers to weather the approach is automated or man-
ual.
 Objective: refers to the main objective of the approach.
 Domain: (e.g. network, database, etc).
 Availability of source code (Avail. of SC).
 Tool support (Tool supp.): refers to the name of tool support.
 Segmentation technique (Seg. tech.): the value (None) means that there
is segmentation but there is no technique.
 Correlation technique (Corr. tech.).
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Greenyer et
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No No None No seg. No correl. Table
Chang and
Ren [71]
Yes No TBL No segm. No correl. None
Xu et al.
[88]











No segm. No correl. Table
Peiris and
Hill [91]
Yes Yes SETAF No segm. No correl. Table
Alawneh et
al. [72]












No No None No segm. No correl. Chart
Saleh et al.
[74]
Yes No SCED No segm. No correl. Graph
Fischer et al.
[75]




Yes Yes Crawler No segm. No correl. Table
Moe and
Carr [77]












Yes No Pintool No segm. No correl. Chart
Noughi et al.
[80]
Yes Yes DAViS No segm. No correl. Table
Taniguchi et
al. [81]
Yes Yes No name No segm. No correl. Graph
Maaradji et
al. [82]
Yes No ProDrift No segm. No correl. Chart
Table 3.2: Comparison of the reviewed works 2
Finally, after reviewing the previous works, we have noticed that most of
the related work focus on functional requirements. My work is related to non-
functional aspects and more precisely high availability. The functional part has







In this chapter, we present our proposed approach to retrieve and analyze high
availability scenarios from system execution traces.
Figure 4.1 describes the steps of our approach as an activity diagram. It
consists of six major steps: (1) collect and filter relevant execution traces, (2)
merge the traces and order the aggregated trace, (3) segment the resulting trace
into execution phases, (4) correlate the execution phases, (5) detect and diagnose
functional and temporal problems, (6) visualize the results.
Although our approach is general and can be applied to any HA feature, we





Merge the filtered 
traces
Segment the 





















Using a set 
of rules
Figure 4.1: High availability scenarios retrieval and analysis approach
4.1 Trace Collection
The first step in our approach is to collect execution traces from Cisco routers
that are involved in the HSRP setup. Traces can be collected from (1) router
console, (2) Terminal (same as console, but displays traces through router’s VTY
line) (3) router buffer (using a fixed size RAM storage), (4) SysLog Server (router
sends the trace data to the syslog server), and (5) SNMP traps (router uses SNMP
traps to send traces to an external SNMP server) [95]. In our experiments, we
have collected traces using the routers consoles.
An example of a trace entry denoting an HSRP-related event is:
May 15 17:23:04.263: %HSRP -5- STATECHANGE: Ethernet2 /0 Grp 1 state
Standby -> Active
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where the facility is HSRP protocol, 5 is the severity 5 denoting a notification,
STATECHANGE represents the MNEMONIC, the message text describes the
fact that interface Ethernet 2/0 part of HSRP group 1 has changes its state from
Standby to Active.
In our approach, the traces collected from the HSRP involved routers are
stored as text files. In the rest of the thesis, we will refer to ”%FACILITY-
severity-MNEMONIC” portion of a log entry as Header.
4.2 Trace Filtering
Execution traces tend to contain a huge amount of data and a lot of noise which
makes them hard to analyze. To address this issue, many trace abstraction and
filtering techniques have been proposed. Most of these techniques can be classi-
fied into three main categories: (1) Pattern detection: these techniques consist
of the matching and grouping of similar trace entries based on their similarity,
(e.g., keywords, regular expressions) [96, 10], (2) Detection and removal of utility
routines: these simplification techniques aim to detect general purpose routines,
that are used across the system [97]. These techniques generally require careful
code instrumentations in order to capture all method calls, (3) Abstraction (or
generalization) techniques: based on extracting high-level views from low-level
operations [98, 99, 100, 101].
In our approach, we have chosen a keyword-based filtering (belongs to the
pattern matching category) technique, given the nature of the collected traces
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and the goal of our proposed approach to focus on high availability scenarios. In
fact, the Cisco IOS traces are native logs and do not contain any information
related to method calls. In addition, we don’t have access to the source code
to instrument it; hence a detection of utility technique is not applicable in our
context. Furthermore, a router may be loaded with dozens of features, e.g., many
routing protocols (BGP, OSPF, etc.), security features, QoS features, etc. Trying
to create an abstract view from such loaded routers may lead to a large set of
useless groups (e.g., group for each feature or sub-feature) that are not relevant
to system high availability. Hence, abstraction techniques are not suitable for our
specific context.
Since our aim is to recover high availability scenarios, the choice of keywords
should fall within these two categories: (a) failure related keywords, and (b) re-
covery related keywords. Hence, a good candidate set of keywords, to be used
as input to our filtering algorithm (also used as user input to HAAnalyzer, our
HSRP-specific prototype tool), may include (1) the router interface status, e.g.,
LINK-5-CHANGED (status of the interface is down), LINK-3-UPDOWN (status
of the interface is up), LINEPROTO-5-UPDOWN (change in the interface status
to up or down), (2) HSRP interface status, e.g., HSRP-5-STATECHANGE (the
HSRP state of interface is changed), TRACKING-5-STATE (the status of tracked
interface of HSRP is changed, if tracking is configured). In addition to the key-
words, the analyst may provide time boundaries (i.e., lower and upper bound) to
retrieve only trace entries that fall within a specific time period.
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The trace filtering process is described in Algorithm 1 and consists of three
phases:
1. Phase1: Parse the entire trace and exclude entries outside the user de-
fined time boundaries, i.e., startTimeBoundary and endTimeBoundary.
The timeStamp attribute of log entries are compared with the user provided
time boundaries.
2. Phase2: Remove any entry that does not have the user specified keywords.
The attribute Header contains information about the source of the event,
e.g., protocol name, process name, its severity and its type. The Trace array
is traversed from the beginning. If the header attribute contains one of the
specified keywords, then we add the corresponding entry to the temporary
array TempArr, otherwise we delete it from the trace.
3. Phase3: In the final step, we discard any entry that is not related to the
HSRP involved groups. To do so, we traverse the TempArr from the be-
ginning and we check whether every interface participates in HSRP (by
checking the attribute Header). The interface is deleted from TempArr in
case it is not related to HSRP. Finally, the content of TempArr is written
to FilteredTrace.txt file.
As an example of applying the filtering algorithm to the trace of (R2) router,
Fig. 4.2(a) shows an excerpt of the trace before filtering and Fig. 4.2(b) shows the
excerpt of the trace after filtering.
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Algorithm 1: Trace Filtering Algorithm
Procedure Name: FilterTrace
Input : TraceFile.txt, String keywords, DateTime startTimeBoundary,
DateTime endTimeBoundary
Output: FilteredTrace.txt
{We define array (TempArr) to insert the filterd entries in it} string [ ][ ]
TempArr = new string [ ];
string[ ][ ] Trace = Read(TraceFile.txt);
int N = Trace.Length;
int related =0;
{Exclude entries which are outside TimeBoundary} for (int i=0 ; i <N ; i++)
do
if (Trace [x][TimeStamp] < startTimeBoundary OR Trace [i][TimeStamp]




{Exclude entries which do not contain any keyword} for (int i=0 ; i <N ;
i++) do






{Exclude entries which do not participate in the HSRP feature} N =
TempArr.Length;





for (int j = N; j >= 0 ; j – –) do
if TempArr[i][Router] == TempArr[j][Router] AND















(a) Excerpt of router R2 trace before filtering
(b) Excerpt of router R2 trace after filtering
Figure 4.2: Excerpt of R2 trace before and after filtering
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4.3 Trace Merging
The output of the previous step is a set of filtered trace files, each file corresponds
to the trace of a single router. In order to merge these traces (without loosing
information about the trace source) and sort the resulting trace, we have created
a table that contains the following fields:
1. Router name: refers to the name of the router to which the log entry belongs.
2. TimeStamp: denotes the log entry timestamp.
3. Header: refers to ”%FACILITY-severity-MNEMONIC” portion of the log
entry.
4. Interface: denotes the router interface name.
5. Group: refers to the HSRP group number, if any.
6. Status change: denotes a change in either interface status, i.e., from UP to
DOWN and vice versa, or the HSRP state, e.g., Standby to Active.
The table is populated using all entries of all filtered traces. The log en-
try Message-text is used to populate the interface name, group and Status change
table fields. Finally all entries are sorted according to their timestamps.
4.4 Trace Segmentation
Trace segmentation refers to the process of identifying sub-sequences (or clus-
ters) of events/actions within a trace. The rationale behind trace segmentation
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is that every cluster of low-level events is supposed to represent the execution of
a higher-level activity [102]. In addition, retrieved clusters should be categorized
and characterized. Many segmentation techniques have been proposed in the lit-
erature. Günther et al. [102] proposed a Global Trace Segmentation approach,
where closely related events are grouped into event classes and represented as
an hierarchy of event classes, i.e., types of events. Asadi et al. [103] introduced
a heuristic-based technique which uses a genetic algorithm to segment traces.
Aguilar et al. [104] proposed and on-line approach that uses event flow graphs to
segment a given execution trace. Gonzalez et al. [105] proposed a density-based
clustering approach. Their approach applies density-based algorithms, such as
DBSCAN, to group the points that have big density regardless of the model or
data structure.
In our approach, we will segment the filtered and merged trace into segments,
called “execution phases”. A segment is composed of a contiguous sequence of log
entries because we want to preserve the order of entries within the trace, to be
able to link a failure to its corresponding recovery (see trace correlation procedure
in Sect. 4.5). This is similar to clustering but in clustering, it is not required to
preserve the order of entries.
Before describing our segmentation procedure, we introduce the concept
of HSRP-upgrading and HSRP-downgrading. As described in section 2.3, HSRP
protocol state machine has six states, ordered according to the high availability
status of the interface. We assume that we have an upgrade or a downgrade
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situation, when we move from one state to another, as follows:





We formalize the concept of HSRP Upgrade and Downgrade as follows:
Definition 4.1 (HSRP Upgrade and Downgrade) Let StatesHSRP = [Ini-
tial, Learn, Listen, Speak, Standby, Active] be an array composed of HSRP states.
Let StateChanges be a set of all possible HSRP state changes. An HSRP state
change is defined as: s1 → s2, where s1, s2 ∈ StatesHSRP.
Given a state change HsrpSC (s1 → s2), we define the function TypeHsrpSC:
StateChanges → {” Upgrade”, ”Downgrade”}, such that TypeHsrpSC(HsrpSC) =
”Upgrade” if index(s1) < index(s2), and TypeHsrpSC(HsrpSC) = ”Downgrade”
if index(s1) > index(s2).
For example, going from a Speak state to a Standby state, is considered as an
upgrade, while going from an Active state to a Standby state is considered as a
downgrade.
Our trace segmentation technique is based on three considerations:
1. The state of the relevant interfaces (i.e., HSRP enabled): A router interface
is either in UP (exchanging control traffic and possibly forwarding data
traffic) or DOWN state (neither control or data traffic flow through it).
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When an active HSRP interface goes down, the elected standby interface
should take over and becomes active, and when the failed interface recovers
and goes back to an UP state again, the traffic may be redirected through
it again. For this reason, we suggest that a new execution phase is created,
whenever a relevant interface changes its status.
2. Two successive execution phases should not have the same state for all
enclosed interfaces, otherwise they should be considered as one single phase.
3. The status of HSRP: a failure recovery is always associated with an HSRP
upgrade. Hence, we propose to create a new execution phase, whenever
we have a HSRP-upgrading situation. In addition, we don’t take into con-
sideration HSRP downgrading, because this may happen if a new interface
having higher priority goes to UP state.
Several techniques for searching cut-points [106] have been proposed, such
as, interpolation search, binary search, jump search, and linear search. We have
chosen the linear search because we have to check every single entry. Algorithm 2
describes our segmentation procedure. Based on a linear search, we look for cut-
points as by separating failures from recoveries as follows: if a trace entry contains
an event where an interface changes its state (from UP to DOWN or vice versa),
then we create a new execution phase. In addition, when an entry contains an
HSRP upgrading, we create a new execution phase. The resulting phases are
numbered sequentially.
Figure 4.3 shows the result of the segmentation process when applied to traces
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Algorithm 2: Trace Segmentation Algorithm
Procedure Name: SegmentTrace
Input : FilteredTraces.txt {Filtered and Merged Traces}
Output: Segmented Trace
string [ ][ ] Trace = Read (FilteredTrace);
{N refers to phase number} int N=1;
for (int i=0 ; i <Traces.Length ; i++) do
if ((Trace [i][Header].Contains(”LINK-3-UPDOWN”)) OR (Trace
[i][Header].Contains(”LINK-5-CHANGED”)) OR (Trace







Figure 4.3: Excerpt of the segmentation result when applied to the merged traces
of R2 and R3
collected from routers R2 and R3 (part of the network topology of Fig. 2.6). The
filtered and merged traces are segmented into 6 execution phases.
4.5 Phase Correlation
Phase correlation aims to connect causes to effects. It has been applied as a root
cause analysis (RCA) approach to find the reasons of failures in case of a bug or a
security breach [107]. There are several approaches for phase correlation, such as,
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rule-based approaches, probabilistic approaches, and model-based approaches. In
this research, we look for correlations between execution phases in order to find
how the HA feature recovers from failures.
In this research, we adopt a rule-based correlation approach. Rules have typ-
ically the following form: <If symptoms then diagnosis>.
Before presenting our correlation rules, we define the following access functions
to retrieve field entries:
Definition 4.2 (Access functions) Let E be the set of merged and segmented
log entries, interfaces be the set of enabled interfaces, phases be the set of phase
numbers.
 Interface: E → interfaces. For a given e ∈ E, Interface (e) returns the
enclosed interface.
 Phase: E→ phases. For a given e ∈ E, Phase (e) returns the phase number
of e.
We define two rules as follows:
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Correlation Rule1:
if (∃ e1,e2 ∈ E | e1 [Header]= LINK-5-CHANGED
AND e1 [Status Change]=Up → Down
AND e2 [Header] = HSRP-5-STATECHANGE
AND TypeHsrpSC (e2[Status Change]) = Downgrade




if (∃ e1,e2 ∈ E | e1 [Header]= LINK-5-CHANGED
AND e1 [Status Change]=Up → Down
AND e2 [Header] = HSRP-5-STATECHANGE
AND TypeHsrpSC (e2[Status Change]) = Upgrade
AND Interface(e1) 6= Interface (e2))
then
Correlation(Phase(e1), Phase(e2))
Algorithm 3 implements the two rules defined above. We start by looking
for the HSRP-enabled failed interfaces (i.e., status change from UP to DOWN).
Next, we look for both (1) HSRP downgrade on the same interface and (2) HSRP
upgrade of a different interface. Searching for HSRP recovery is modeled as a
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separate algorithm (described in Algorithm 4). The correlation between the exe-
cution phase containing the failure and the execution phase containing the recover
(i.e., HSRP upgrade) is further characterized as ”High” or ”Low”, based on the
temporal distance between the two phases (i.e., compute the difference between
the involved timestamps).
Algorithm 3: Trace Correlation Algorithm
Procedure Name: CorrelateTrace
Input : SegTrace {Segmented Trace} + TemporalDistance
Output: Correlated Trace
string [ ][ ] Traces = Read(SegTrace);
int N = Traces.Length;
for (x=0 ; x <N ; x++) do
{Search for failures} if (Traces[x][Protocol].Contain(“LINK-DOWN”))
then
string correlatedString =Empty;
{Search for HSRP downgrade} for (frwd=x+1; frwd <N; frwd++) do
if (Traces[frwd][Router Name] == Traces[x][Router Name] AND
Traces[frwd][Interface] == Traces[x][Interface] AND
Traces[frwd][Status Change] == Downgrade) then
{Look for recovery} correlatedString.Append
(FindRecovery(Traces, frwd, x, TemporalDistance));
end
end








Analysts may provide the temporal distance (in seconds) as input to the our
HAAnalyzer prototype tool (see Fig. 4.5(a)). This information may be retrieved
from HSRP router configuration, if available. If the recovery took place within the
user-defined temporal distance, the correlation is considered as ”High”, otherwise
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Algorithm 4: Find Recovery Algorithm
Procedure Name: FindRecovery
Input : Traces {Array} + temp + original + TemporalDistance
Output: CorrelatedString
{Search for HSRP upgrade} for (frwd= temp +1; frwd <N; frwd ++) do
if ((Traces[frwd][Router Name] != Traces[temp][Router Name] AND
Traces[frwd][Interface] != Traces[temp][Interface] )AND
Traces[frwd][Group] == Traces[temp][ Group] AND Traces[frwd][Status
Change] == Upgrade) then









the correlation is considered as ”Low”.
Figure 4.4 displays an example of phases correlation. In this example, phase 3
represents the interface failure (R3-Ethernet2/0 went from UP to DOWN state),
phase 4 shows the HSRP downgrade (interface R3-Ethernet2/0 went from Active
to Init), and phase 5 shows the recovery (i.e., HSRP upgrade of interface R2-
Ethernet2/0) from Standby to Active). The correlation summary is shown in
Fig. 4.5(b) produced by HAAnalyzer.
Figure 4.4: Correlation of the execution phases found in Fig. 4.3
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4.6 Fault Detection and Diagnosis
The output of the correlation phase would serve as a base checking the HA feature
behavior and for detecting potential issues in the collected traces. Indeed, the
correlation phase has three outcomes:
1. Trace exhibits a wrong behavior: Such a functional problem is experi-
enced when the system does not recover from a failure. This happens when
an execution phase showing a failure condition, is not correlated with a re-
covery phase; hence we deduce that the failure is not handled by HSRP. We
refer to this situation as “No reaction”(see Algorithm 3).
2. Trace exhibits a temporal problem: In such a case, the system recovers
from a failure but the recovery takes place after the tolerable/acceptable re-
sponse time. That is, during a fail-over the time taken by the standby inter-
face to become active is greater than the normal/configured one. Temporal
issues are identified as “Low”correlation between the failure and recovery
execution phases.
3. Trace exhibits a correct behavior: A correct HSRP scenario, where the
system recovers from a failure within an acceptable period of time. That
is, the phase that corresponds to the recovery is highly correlated with the
phase having the failure.
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4.7 HAAnalyzer: High Availability Analyzer
Tool
As a proof of concept, we have built HAAnalyzer. The first prototype of our
tool is HSRP-specific and aims to retrieve and analyze HSRP high availability
scenarios. HAAnalyzer is a windows-based application, developed using Microsoft
.Net C# language and Microsoft .Net Framework 4.5. The tool consists of two
main forms:
1. Input form (Fig. 4.5(a)) that allows users to create a new or open an existing
project. Each project is associated with a folder that contains one or many
log traces in a textual format. In addition to the traces, the user can specify
filtering criteria (i.e., keywords and time boundaries) and the correlation
criteria (i.e., temporal distance).
2. Output form (Fig. 4.5(b)) that displays the segmented and correlated trace
in a tabular format. Different colors are used to distinguish different types
of events and correlations. Link failures are colored in red, an HSRP Down-
grade is colored in light coral, and the recovery entry is colored in green.
High correlation are colored in light blue, while a low correlation is colored
in yellow.
Trace entries and their related information are stored using a DataTable object,
while the results are displayed using DataGridView control. In addition, the tool
allows users to export the fault detection and diagnosis (FDD) report to PDF
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format.
(a) HAAnalyzer input form
(b) HAAnalyzser output form




The aim of our empirical evaluation is two fold: (1) validate our approach through
the design and execution of HSRP scenarios on four real-world network topolo-
gies implementing the HSRP protocol and analyze the resulting traces using our
proposed approach and prototype tool HAAnalyzer, and (2) to measure the ef-
fectiveness and accuracy of the fault detection and diagnosis capability through
the injection of faults and checking whether our HAAnalyzer tool is able to unveil
them. The effectiveness of our tool is measured using precision and recall metrics.
5.1 Experiment Setup
To evaluate our approach and HAAnalyzer prototype tool, we have used four
testbed topologies, inspired from different sources [108, 109, 110, 111] covering
typical HSRP network topologies. The testbeds are built using the Graphical
Network Simulator 3 (GNS3) simulation software [112]. GNS3 can emulate com-
plex networks since it has the ability to combine actual devices and virtual devices.
64
In our context, GNS3 supports the Cisco IOS via the use of Dynamips which is a
software that emulates Cisco IOS on a PC.
Powered by TCPDF (www.tcpdf.org)
Powered by TCPDF (www.tcpdf.org)
(a) Testbed Topology 1
(b) Testbed Topology 2
Figure 5.1: HSRP testbed topologies
The technical details of the four selected HSRP testbed topologies are as fol-
65
(a) Testbed Topology 3
(b) Testbed Topology 4
Figure 5.2: HSRP testbed topologies
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lows:
 Topology 1 (2 routers involved in HSRP): It is inspired from [108] and
shown in Fig. 5.1(a). Routers R1 and R4 communicate through routers R2
and R3. The HSRP system consists of two nodes only R2-e2/0 and R3-e2/0.
The topology has two HSRP groups and their virtual IPs are 10.1.1.15 and
10.1.1.20 respectively. The Ethernet link between R2-e2/2 and R3-e2/2 is
for NTP (Network Time Protocol), which is used to synchronize the time
between routers R1 and R2.
 Topology 2 (2 routers involved in HSRP): The second topology is
inspired from [109] and shown in Fig. 5.1(b). Two PCs (PC1 and PC2)
are communicating with router R3 via an HSRP system composed of two
nodes R1-e2/0 and R2-e2/0. In this topology, every node in HSRP system is
connected to its own switch and the switches SW1 and SW2 are connected
to each other. The Ethernet link between R1-e2/2 and R2-e2/2 is for NTP
protocol, which is used to synchronize the time between routers R1 and R2.
 Topology 3: (3 routers involved in HSRP): It is inspired from [110]
and shown in Fig. 5.2(a). It is similar to Topology 2, except that it has an
extra node R2 participating in HSRP, allowing for different HSRP scenarios.
The HSRP group consists of R1-e2/0, R2-e2, and R3-E2/0 and the virtual
IP address is 10.1.1.50.
 Topology 4: (3 routers involved in HSRP): It is inspired from [111] and
67
shown in Fig. 5.2(b). Routers R1 and R5 communicate through a network
of 3 routers R2, R3, and R4. The HSRP system consists of three nodes R2-
e2/0, R3-e2/0, and R4-e2/0 with virtual IP address 10.1.1.50. Compared to
Topology 3, different HSRP scenarios can be executed.
5.2 Experiment Procedure
In this section, we describe our validation and effectiveness evaluation procedures.
5.2.1 Validation Procedure
Using the testbed topologies that we built in Sect. 5.1, we designed a set of
scenarios and executed them on those topologies. For each topology, we execute
the scenarios in sequence to try to mimic realistic network engineer tasks, e.g.,
HSRP configuration, bringing interfaces UP and DOWN, etc. Tables 5.1- 5.6
describe the scenarios executed on the four network topologies. For each scenario,
we present the precondition and the executed steps.
5.2.2 Effectiveness Evaluation Procedure
In order to evaluate the effectiveness of our approach and our HAAnalyzer pro-
totype tool, we have merged many traces produced by selected scenarios for each
network topology 5.1. Next, we have injected randomly 15 faults (functional and
temporal) into the resulting four traces, as follows: (1) 10 faults where we have
deleted the recovery after the failer (i.e., removed the fail-over), and (2) 5 faults
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Scenario ID Preconditions Scenario steps
Topo1-Sc1 1- Interfaces R2-E2/0 & R3-E2/0 are
HSRP-enabled (no priority was
specified)
2- Both interfaces R2-E2/0 & R3-E2/0
are in shutdown state.
1- Unshut the interfaces.
2- Shutdown the active
interface then unshut it
again.
Topo1-Sc2 1- Interfaces R2-E2/0 & R3-E2/0 are
HSRP-enabled.
2- R3-E2/0 is in active state, while
R2-E2/0 is in standby state.
1- Shutdown the standby
interface R2-E2/0.
2- Shutdown the active
interface R3-E2/0.
Topo1-Sc3 1- Interfaces R2-E2/0 & R3-E2/0 are
HSRP-enabled.
2- R2-E2/0 is the active interface.
3- R2-E2/1 (the forward interface) is
not configured with HSRP tracking.
Shutdown the forward
interface R2-E2/1
Topo1-Sc4 1- Interfaces R2-E2/0 & R3-E2/0 are
HSRP-enabled (priority was specified
without preempt property).
2- R2-E2/0 interface has the highest
priority.
3- R2-E2/1 is the forward interface
(configured to be tracked)
4- R2-E2/0 is the active interface,
R3-E2/0 is in standby state.
Shutdown the forward
interface R2-E2/1
Topo1-Sc5 1- Interfaces R2-E2/0 & R3-E2/0 are
HSRP-enabled (priority was specified
with preempt property).
2- R2-E2/0 interface has the highest
priority.
3- R2-E2/1 is the forward interface
(configured to be tracked)
4- R2-E2/0 is the active interface,
R3-E2/0 is in standby state.
Shutdown the forward
interface R2-E2/1
Table 5.1: Network topology 1: HSRP scenarios (part 1)
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Scenario ID Preconditions Scenario steps
Topo1-Sc6 1- Interfaces R2-E2/0 & R3-E2/0 are
HSRP-enabled.
2- HSRP IP is 10.1.1.15/24.
Change the HSRP IP at
runtime to 10.1.1.50
Topo1-Sc7 1- Interfaces R2-E2/0 & R3-E2/0 are
HSRP-enabled.
2- The hello time is changed to 20
seconds and hold time to 25 seconds.
3- R2-E2/0 is in standby state.
4- R3-E2/0 is in active state.
Shutdown R3-E2/0 then
unshut it again
Topo1-Sc8 1- Two HSRP groups Gr1 & Gr2
sharing the same interfaces R2-E2/0 &
R3-E2/0.
2- R2-E2/0 is the active node of Gr1
and the standby node of Gr2.
3- R3-E2/0 is the active node of Gr2
and the standby node of Gr1.
Shutdown the active node
of Gr1 R2-E2/0
Topo1-Sc9 1- Interfaces R2-E2/0 & R3-E2/0 are
HSRP-enabled (priority was specified
with preempt property).
2- R2-E2/0 has the highest priority.
3- R3-E2/0 is in active state and
R2-E2/1 is the tracked interface (the
tracked interface is in shutdown state).
Unshut the tracked
interface R2-E2/1
Topo1-Sc10 1-Interfaces R2-E2/0 & R3-E2/0 are
HSRP-enabled.
2- R3-E2/0 is in standby state
Shutdown the standby
interface (R3-E2/0)
Table 5.2: Network topology 1: HSRP scenarios (part 2)
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Scenario ID Preconditions Scenario steps
Topo2-Sc1 1- Interfaces R1-E2/0 & R2-E2/0 are
HSRP-enabled (priority was specified).
2- R1-E2/0 has higher priority.








Topo2-Sc2 1- Interfaces R1-E2/0 & R2-E2/0 are
HSRP-enabled (priority was specified
without preempt property).





Topo2-Sc3 1- Interfaces R1-E2/0 & R2-E2/0 are
HSRP-enabled (priority was specified with
preempt property).





Topo2-Sc4 1- Interfaces R1-E2/0 & R2-E2/0 are
HSRP-enabled (priority was specified
without preempt property).
2- R1-E2/0 & R2-E2/0 have the same
priority.







Table 5.3: Network topology 2: HSRP scenarios (part 1)
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Scenario ID Preconditions Scenario steps
Topo2-Sc5 1- Interfaces R1-E2/0 & R2-E2/0 are
HSRP-enabled (priority was specified with
preempt property).
2- R1-E2/0 has higher priority.





Topo2-Sc6 1- Interfaces R1-E2/0 & R2-E2/0 are
HSRP-enabled (priority was specified with
preempt property).
2- R1-E2/0 has higher priority.





Topo2-Sc7 1- Interfaces R1-E2/0 & R2-E2/0 are
HSRP-enabled (priority was specified
without preempt property).




R1-E2/0 to be less
than the standby
node R2-E2/0.
Topo2-Sc8 1- Interfaces R1-E2/0 & R2-E2/0 are
HSRP-enabled (priority was specified with
preempt property).




E2/0 to be less
than the standby
node R2-E2/0.
Topo2-Sc9 1- Interfaces R1-E2/0 & R2-E2/0 are
HSRP-enabled (priority was specified with
preempt property).
2- R1-E2/0 & R2-E2/0 have the same
priority.







Table 5.4: Network topology 2: HSRP scenarios (part 2)
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Scenario ID Preconditions Scenario steps
Topo3-Sc1 1- Three interfaces R1-E2/0, R2-E2/0, &
R3-E2/0 are HSRP-enabled (no priority was
specified).






Topo3-Sc2 1- Three interfaces R1-E2/0, R2-E2/0, &
R3-E2/0 are HSRP-enabled (priority was
specified)






Topo3-Sc3 1- Three interfaces R1-E2/0, R2-E2/0, &
R3-E2/0 are HSRP-enabled (priority was
specified).
2- All interfaces have the same priority.






Topo3-Sc4 1- Three interfaces R1-E2/0, R2-E2/0, &
R3-E2/0 are HSRP-enabled (priority was
specified without preempt).






Topo3-Sc5 1- Three interfaces R1-E2/0, R2-E2/0, &
R3-E2/0 are HSRP-enabled (priority was
specified with preempt).






Topo3-Sc6 1- Three interfaces R1-E2/0, R2-E2/0, &
R3-E2/0 are HSRP-enabled (priority was
specified with preempt).
2- R1-E2/0 has the highest priority & R3-E2/0
has a higher priority than R2-E2/0.





Topo3-Sc7 1- Three interfaces R1-E2/0, R2-E2/0, &
R3-E2/0 are HSRP-enabled (priority was
specified with preempt).
2- R1-E2/0 has the highest priority & R3-E2/0
has a higher priority than R2-E2/0.






Table 5.5: Network topology 3: HSRP scenarios
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Scenario ID Preconditions Scenario steps
Topo4-Sc1 1- Interfaces R2-E2/0 & R3-E2/0 are
HSRP-enabled (no priority was specified).
2- R2-E2/0 is in active state.
Add a new node
(R4-E2/0) to HSRP
group.
Topo4-Sc2 1- Three interfaces R2-E2/0, R3-E2/0, &
R4-E2/0 are HSRP-enabled (no priority was
specified).




Topo4-Sc3 1- Interfaces R2-E2/0 & R3-E2/0 are
HSRP-enabled (priority was specified).
2- R2-E2/0 has the highest priority.






Topo4-Sc4 1- Three interfaces R2-E2/0, R3-E2/0, &
R4-E2/0 are HSRP-enabled (priority was
specified).




Topo4-Sc5 1- Two interfaces R2-E2/0 & R3-E2/0 are
HSRP-enabled (priority was specified).
2- R2-E2/0 has the highest priority.






Table 5.6: Network topology 4: HSRP scenarios
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where we have delayed the recovery by changing the timestamps of the log entries
related to the fail-over. Table 5.7 describes the distribution of the injected faults
in the four testbed topologies.









Topo1 15 5 0
Topo2 15 1 2
Topo3 11 3 2
Topo4 3 1 1
Total 44 10 5
Table 5.7: Faults distribution
5.3 Experiment Results
In this section, we present and discuss our results.
5.3.1 Validation Experimental Results
Tables 5.8 - 5.12 show the results of the executed scenarios on the four network
topologies. For each scenario, we describe the observed behavior and the correla-
tions between different execution phases produced by our tool.
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Scenario ID Observed behavior Phase
correlations
Topo1-Sc1 1- R2-E2/0 is in active state & R3-E2/0
is in standby state
2- R2-E2/0 is in init state & R3-E2/0 is
in active state
3- R2-E2/0 is in standby state
(P5, P6, High)
Topo1-Sc2 1- R2-E2/0 is in init state
2- R3-E2/0 is in init state
(P12, P13, High)
(P14, P15, High)
Topo1-Sc3 No HSRP-relevant events No Reaction
Topo1-Sc4 No HSRP-relevant events No Recovery
Topo1-Sc5 R2-E2/0 is in standby state & R3-E2/0
is in active state
No Recovery
Topo1-Sc6 No HSRP-relevant events No Reaction
Topo1-Sc7 1- R3-E2/0 is in init state & R2-E2/0 is
in active state after 25 seconds
2- R3-E2/0 is in standby state
(P18, P19, High)
Topo1-Sc8 1- R2-E2/0 is in init state for Gr1 & Gr2
2- R3-E2/0 is in active state for Gr1.
(P20, P21, High)
(P20, P22, High)
Topo1-Sc9 R2-E2/0 is in active state No Reaction
Topo1-Sc10 R3-E2/0 is in init state (P29, P31, High)
Table 5.8: Network topology 1: Results
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Scenario ID Observed behavior Phase
correlations
Topo2-Sc1 1- R1-E2/0 is in active state & R2-E2/0
is in standby state
2- R1-E2/0 is in init state & R2-E2/0 is
in active state.
3- R1-E2/0 is in standby state
(P4, P5, Low)
Topo2-Sc2 1- R1-E2/0 is in init state & R2-E2/0 is
in active state.
2- R1-E2/0 is in standby state
(P8, P9, High)
(P8, P10, High)
Topo2-Sc3 1- R1-E2/0 is in init state & R2-E2/0 is
in active state
2- R1-E2/0 is in active state & R2-E2/0
is in standby state
(P12, P13, High)
(P12, P14, High)
Topo2-Sc4 1- R2-E2/0 is in active state & R1-E2/0
is in standby state
2- R2-E2/0 is in init state & R1-E2/0 is
in active state
3- R2-E2/0 is in standby state
(P16, P17, High)
Topo2-Sc5 1- R1-E2/0 is in init state & R2-E2/0 is
in active state
2- R1-E2/0 becomes active within 1
second & R2-E2/0 is in standby state
(P20, P21, High)
Topo2-Sc6 1- R1-E2/0 is in init state & R2-E2/0 is
in active state
2- R1-E2/0 becomes active after 1
minute which represents the delay time
& R2-E2/0 is in standby state
(P24, P25, High)
Topo2-Sc7 No HSRP-relevant events No Correlation
Topo2-Sc8 R2-E2/0 is in active state & R1-E2/0 is
in standby state
No Correlation
Topo2-Sc9 1- R1-E2/0 is in active state & R2-E2/0
is in standby state
2- R1-E2/0 is in init state & R2-E2/0 is
in active state
3- R1-E2/0 is in standby state
(P36, P37, High)
(P36, P38, High)
Table 5.9: Network topology 2: Results
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Scenario ID Observed behavior Phase
correlations
Topo3-Sc1 1- R3-E2/0 is in active state, R1-E2/0 is
in listen state & R2-E2/0 is in standby
state
2- R3-E2/0 is in init state, R1-E2/0 is
in standby state & R2-E2/0 is in active
state
3- R3-E2/0 is in standby state &
R1-E2/0 is in listen state
(P2, P3, High)
(P2, P4, Low)
Topo3-Sc2 1- R1-E2/0 is in active state & R2-E2/0
is in standby state
2- R1-E2/0 is in init state, R3-E2/0 is
in standby state & R2-E2/0 is in active
state
3- R1-E2/0 is in standby state &
R3-E2/0 is in listen state
(P12, P13, High)
(P12, P14, High)
Topo3-Sc3 1- R3-E2/0 is in active state & R2-E2/0
is in standby state
2- R3-E2/0 is in init state, R1-E2/0 is
in standby state & R2-E2/0 is in active
state
3- R3-E2/0 is in standby state &
R1-E2/0 is in listen state
(P22, P23, High)
(P22, P24, High)
Topo3-Sc4 1- R3-E2/0 is in init state, R1-E2/0 is
in standby state & R2-E2/0 is in active
state
2- R3-E2/0 is in standby state &
R1-E2/0 is in listen state
(P26, P27, High)
(P26, P28, High)
Topo3-Sc5 1- R2-E2/0 is in init state, R3-E2/0 is
in active state & R1-E2/0 is in standby
state




Table 5.10: Network topology 3: Results (part 1)
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Scenario ID Observed behavior Phase
correlations
Topo3-Sc6 1- R1-E2/0 is in init state, R3-E2/0 is
in active state & R2-E2/0 is in standby
state




Topo3-Sc7 1- R1-E2/0 is in init state, R3-E2/0 is
in active state & R2-E2/0 is in standby
state




Table 5.11: Network topology 3: Results (part 2)
Scenario ID Observed behavior Phase
correlations
Topo4-Sc1 R4-E2/0 is in listen state No Correlation
Topo4-Sc2 R4-E2/0 is in standby state & R3-E2/0
is in active state
(P5, P7, High)
Topo4-Sc3 R4-E2/0 is in standby state & R3-E2/0
is in listen state
No Correlation
Topo4-Sc4 1- R4-E2/0 is in init state, R3-E2/0 is
in active state & R2-E2/0 is in standby
state
2- R4-E2/0 is in standby state &
R2-E2/0 is in listen state
(P9, P10, High)
Topo4-Sc5 R4-E2/0 is in active state, R2-E2/0 is in
standby state, & R3-E2/0 is in Listen
state
No Correlation
Table 5.12: Network topology 4: Results
79
Amongst the 31 executed scenarios, three (Topo1-Sc3, Topo1-Sc6, and Topo2-
Sc7) did not generate any HSRP relevant events (see observed behavior column).
In scenario Topo1-Sc3, the forward interface R2-E2/1 is not configured with HSRP
tracking property, so when we shutdown R2-E2/1, HSRP protocol did react to this
event. In scenario Topo1-Sc4, the forward interface R2-E2/1 is configured with
HSRP tracking property but without preempt property, so when we shutdown
R2-E2/1, also HSRP protocol did react to this event. In scenario Topo1-Sc5
& Topo1-Sc9, the forward interface R2-E2/1 is configured with HSRP tracking
property and preempt property. In these two scenarios, when we shutdown or
unshutdown R2-E2/1, the tool could detect the HSRP reaction (although there
is) because the name of HSRP-downgrading interface did not match with the
name of failed interface.
To compute the accuracy of our tool, we divide the number of successful sce-
narios by the total number of scenarios. We obtain a ratio of 29/31 = 0.935, which
is very satisfiable.
5.3.2 Effectiveness measurement
In order to measure the effectiveness of our approach and our prototype tool, we
use precision, recall, and F-measure metrics [113]. Precision and recall are mostly
used in the domain of information retrieval. Generally, precision shows how useful
the approach is; whereas, recall shows how complete the results of the approach
are. Precision and recall are calculated based on a confusion matrix [114] showing
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the predicted (retrieved by HAAnalyzer) and the actual (prepared) classifications.
In our context, the confusion matrix is composed of:
1. True positives (TP): Traces do contain actual faults and HAAnalyzer
identified them as faulty.
2. True negatives (TN): Traces do not contain actual faults and HAAnalyzer
identified them as not faulty.
3. False positives (FP): Traces do not contain actual faults and HAAnalyzer
identified them as faulty.
4. False negatives (FN): Traces do contain actual faults and HAAnalyzer
identified them as not faulty.
Using the confusion matrix values (see Fig. 5.13), we computed precision, re-
call, and F-measure. As defined in [113], precision is the total number of results
retrieved which are relevant divided by the total number of items that are re-





Recall is the total number of retrieved results which are relevant divided by








































Table 5.13: Confusion matrix
F-measure is the harmonic average of precision and recall. It is computed as:
F −measure = 2 ∗ precision ∗ recall
precision + recall
(5.3)
Figure 5.13 shows the confusion matrix produced from our empirical results. It
shows that all of the 15 injected faults (true positives) were successfully detected
and diagnosed.
Based on the values of the confusion matrix, we obtained a recall of 1.0, pre-
cision of 1.0 and an F-measure of 1.0. HAAnalyzer has been very effective for the




In this chapter, we will discuss the benefits of our proposed approach, and discuss
the potential threats to validity.
6.1 Benefits of the Approach
Our proposed approach has the following benefits:
1. It addresses the problem of recovering non-functional requirements from ex-
ecution traces. Indeed very little research was devoted to applying dynamic
analysis to quality attributes. The only work that tackles availability quality
attribute is the work by Hassine et al. [10].
2. It visualizes high availability scenarios using a tabular format showing the
different execution phases along with existing correlation. Colors are used
to facilitate the identification of correlations and the detection of functional
and temporal issues. In [10], availability scenarios are visualized using the
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Use Case Maps notation, which may be difficult to comprehend if the analyst
is not familiar with the notation.
3. Our approach allows for fault detection and diagnosis, allowing for check-
ing implementation bugs. Indeed, functional and temporal faults can be
detected by using our segmentation and correlation techniques.
4. Our approach does not rely on source code availability. However, the devel-
opment of the approach for HSRP was based on RFC 2281 [36].
5. Our approach does not rely on the availability of routers configurations. It
accepts as input, the execution traces from the participating systems and a
set of keywords to be used for filtering.
6. Although the approach is tailored to HSRP, it can be extended with no
significant effort to cover Layer 3 (network layer) HA features such as VRRP
and GLBP.
6.2 Threats to Validity
In this section, we present potential threats to validity classified according to the
three types Construct Validity, External Validity,and Internal Validity, proposed
by Wright et al.[115].
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6.2.1 Construct Validity
One possible risk is the scalability of the approach in handling large execution
traces. Indeed, large traces would lead to a large number of execution phases.
This may have a negative impact on the navigation between the correlated phases.
However, this risk can be mitigated by using an effective filtering (i.e., through
the selection of a relevant and minimal set of keywords). In addition, the use
of colors to distinguish execution phases describing failures (i.e., red color) from
recovery (i.e., using green color), and between High and Low correlations, would
help minimize this risk.
6.2.2 Internal Validity
One potential risk that might reduce the accuracy of our proposed correlation
technique is the severity (priority) of the logging. Because the severity is not
fixed and differ from one system to another, this may alter the order of trace
entries. For instance, a recovery may precede a failure of a link. This variability
of the order of trace entries can be mitigated by ensuring that logging priorities
are the same across all participating systems.
Another possible threat is the incompleteness of the collected trace. Initially,
we suppose that the trace is complete; but in case of incompleteness, this might
reduce the accuracy of the correlation. For instance, if there are missing entries,
it might happen that one recovery can be assigned to another failure which is not
the original cause of the recovery.
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Another possible threat is that our approach requires to have the traces from
all the interacting routers. Therefore, the analyst must know all the interacting
components in order to get their traces and any missing trace may affect the
correctness of the produced results.
Finally, our approach uses a keyword-based filtering process. Inaccurate or
missing keywords may lead to wrong results. To mitigate this threat, a set of
relevant keywords may be provided as a help to the analyst.
6.2.3 External Validity
As per the external validity, merging traces from different devices from different
vendors may represent a potential risk. Indeed each vendor has its own logging
format and constraints of device configurations. So many discrepancies may arise;
such as, event logger priority (i.e. we can find many devices with different prior-
ities) and time references. These issues may lead to merged trace with incorrect
chronological order of entries.
Another threat may arise if we try to generalize our approach to cover other
layer 3 (network layer) high availability protocols like VRRP and GLBP on Cisco
routers. This risk can be mitigated if we choose carefully the set of keywords for
any additional feature. In addition, correlation rules require minor modification
to accommodate the new features.
Finally, our empirical evaluation showed that our tool is effective (precision of





In this chapter, we first review the main contributions of the thesis, relate them
to the research hypothesis and discuss whether our initial goals have been met.
Finally, we propose some directions for future research.
7.1 Hypotheses and Contributions of the Thesis
In this thesis we have proposed an approach to recover high availability scenarios
from system execution traces.
Our first research hypothesis is denoted as follows: Large and complex system
execution traces can be filtered and reduced to focus on high availability aspects. We
have shown in our empirical evaluation (Chapter 5) that our approach was very
successful in retrieving HA scenarios from complex HSRP [15] system execution
traces produced in four different real-world topologies. The validation of the
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approach was conducted using our prototype tool, HAAnalyzer, that automates
all proposed activities, e.g., execution trace filtering, consolidation, segmentation,
correlation, visualization, and analysis (Contributions 1, 3, and 5).
Our second research hypothesis is denoted as follows: High availability scenar-
ios, embedded in log traces, can be segmented (into execution phases) and correlated
in order to link failures and recovery mechanisms. We have proposed a rule-based
technique (implemented in an algorithm) in order to segment and correlate differ-
ent execution phases. Our correlation technique aims to link failures to recovery
and visualize existing correlations in a tabular format (Contribution 2).
Our third research hypothesis is denoted as follows: High availability scenarios
can be analyzed effectively allowing for fault detection and diagnosis. One of the
contribution of the thesis (Contribution 4) is the development of a fault detection
and diagnosis capability allowing for unveiling both functional and temporal issues
in the execution traces.
7.2 Future work
As a future works, we plan to:
1. Improve the capabilities of our HAAnalyzer prototype tool, e.g., by propos-
ing a set of keywords that analysts can choose from, offering other forms of
visualization, etc.
2. Further test our tool by applying it to traces collected from service providers
routers (Our empirical evaluation was based on traces collected through
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simulation using GNS3 network simulation tool).
3. Investigate the applicability of our approach to other high availability fea-
tures such as VRRP and GLBP.
4. Create profiles for other high availability features.
5. Look into applying the same concept to recover security scenarios from ex-
ecution traces collected from systems running security feature such as ACL
(Access control lists) and uRPF (Reverse path forwarding). This would
helps security analysts link attacks to defense mechanisms.
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